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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
Eastern Pilots Merger Committee ("EPMC" or 
"Appellants") appeals from a judgment of the district court 
affirming an order entered by the bankruptcy court 
enforcing a Reorganization Plan in favor of Appellee, 
Continental Airlines, Inc. This appeal requires us to decide 
two questions: (1) whether the district court erred in 
interpreting the decision in In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 
125 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Continental I "), as 
encompassing Appellants' post-confirmation rights under a 
collective bargaining agreement of Eastern Airlines, Inc.; 
and (2) if this court's decision in Continental I is so 
interpreted, whether that decision should be reconsidered. 
 
Because the facts and procedural history have been set 
forth in detail in Continental I, we discuss here only the 
bare adjudicative facts underlying our discussion of the 
legal issues presented. 
 
This dispute centers around an action which took place 
on February 23, 1986, when Eastern Airlines, Inc. and its 
pilots' union, the Air Lines Pilot Association ("ALPA"), 
ratified a collective bargaining agreement ("the Agreement") 
that included certain Labor Protective Provisions ("LPP's"). 
Under these LPP's, Eastern's pilots secured protection of 
their seniority rights in the event of a merger between 
Eastern and another airline carrier by requiring 
the integration of Eastern's seniority list with the merging 
carrier's list. The next day, Texas Air Corporation, parent 
corporation of Continental, acquired Eastern. 
Subsequently, Continental initiated a Chapter 11 
reorganization proceeding. 
 
ALPA filed protective proofs of claim ("Claims") in 
Continental's bankruptcy, contending that because"a 
merger between Eastern and another airline carrier 
[Continental]" had taken place, its members were entitled to 
specific performance of seniority rights under the LPP's, 
together with money damages. Thereafter, Continental's 
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Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization was 
confirmed by the bankruptcy court. The court's 
confirmation order essentially clarified that any valid claims 
based on the LPP's would give rise to a right of financial 
payments that would be dischargeable in bankruptcy. It 
also provided that Claimants had no right to injunctive, 
equitable or other relief. 
 
After appealing the bankruptcy court's order to the 
district court, ALPA settled with Continental, but the LPP 
Claimants continued their appeal. Unsuccessful in the 
district court, several groups, including the present 
Appellants, appealed to this court. We ruled that the 
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to decide how the Claims 
would be treated in bankruptcy, i.e., that "the bankruptcy 
court was well within its authority to exercise jurisdiction 
over the issue of the status of the bankruptcy claim[s]." In 
re Continental Airlines, Inc., 125 F.3d at 131. And critically 
important, we determined that the Claims could be 
converted to money damages. Id. at 136. 
 
The Supreme Court denied a Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. LLP Claimants v. Continental Airlines, 522 U.S. 
1114 (1998). 
 
In response to the commencement of a separate lawsuit 
brought by Appellants in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey (the "New Jersey Action"), 
Continental filed a Reorganized Debtors' Motion for Order 
Compelling Compliance with Order Confirming Plan of 
Reorganization and for Sanctions ("the Compliance Motion") 
in the bankruptcy court seeking to halt the New Jersey 
Action. The airline sought a determination that the 
Confirmation Order barred the New Jersey Action because 
all potential relief relating to the LPP's had been addressed 
in the bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court agreed 
with Continental, stating: 
 
       [S]ince we find that the decision of the Third Circuit 
       affirmed the ruling that all claims of the Eastern Pilots 
       are discharged by the Confirmation Order, we conclude 
       that the Confirmation Order does bar the New Jersey 
       Action instituted by EPMC. Continental is entitled to 
       sanctions against EPMC for its knowing and willful 
       violation of the Confirmation Order. 
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In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 236 B.R. 318, 332 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 1999). 
 
The bankruptcy court had interpreted Continental I to 
mean that all remedies for breach of the LPP's, whether 
before or after bankruptcy, had been reduced to claims for 
payment in the bankruptcy proceeding and had been 
discharged by the Confirmation Order. 
 
On appeal, the district court held that Continental I 
precluded any post-confirmation relief. According to the 
court, "although the [Agreement] survived the bankruptcy 
process, [A]ppellants' demand for specific performance of 
the seniority integration clause did not." In re Continental 
Airlines, Inc., No. 99-795, slip op. at 6 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 
2000). Furthermore, the district court stated that the 
bankruptcy process would be "meaningless" if the teachings 
of Continental I did not require that any claim for 
prospective relief through specific performance be 
discharged. Id. at 4. Thereafter, EPMC appealed. 
 
I. 
 
Appellants repeatedly emphasize that the members of the 
EPMC have a post-confirmation right to enforce the LPP's 
contained in the Agreement because Continental failed to 
reject the Agreement in accordance with the requirements 
of 11 U.S.C. S 1113. Building on this major premise, 
Appellants then argue that because Continental failed to 
properly reject the Agreement, it was assumed by operation 
of law. Appellants direct our attention to a number of cases, 
including In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 
1992), in which we stated: 
 
       The Union contends that since Roth American has not 
       sought to reject the collective bargaining agreement 
       under section 1113, Roth American has "assumed" the 
       collective bargaining agreement by operation of law, 
       and that Roth American thus is bound by all of its 
       terms. We agree with the Union . . . 
 
Id. at 957. Appellants then argue that under 11 U.S.C. 
S 365, if the Agreement is assumed it must be assumed 
cum onere, and any breach of the Agreement must be 
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cured. Appellants' Brief at 13-14 (citing National Labor 
Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531-532 
(1984)). From the foregoing premises they urge us to 
conclude that because the Agreement "rides through the 
bankruptcy" as if the bankruptcy had never occurred, the 
LLP provisions continue to be an unsatisfied obligation on 
the reorganized debtor as to all seniority rights. Id. (citing 
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 546 n.12 (Brennan, J., 
concurring)). 
 
II. 
 
Distilled to its essence, the argument states that because 
Continental did not follow the statutory procedures for 
rejecting an executory contract as set forth in 11 U.S.C. 
S 1113, somehow Appellants are entitled to the injunctive 
relief post-confirmation that it sought and was denied 
during the bankruptcy proceedings. There is a glaring 
defect in Appellants' argument because its basic 
assumption is flawed. The reality is that the Agreement has 
never been rejected. This makes their entire rejection 
argument irrelevant to the motion to enforce the 
Reorganization Plan. 
 
In the various proceedings arising out of the Plan, 
proceedings on all levels of the judicial hierarchy, including 
this court, no court has proceeded on the basis that the 
Agreement had been rejected. In the case at bar, which 
seeks enforcement of the Plan, neither the bankruptcy 
court nor the district court so suggested. Nor do we do so 
here. 
 
Rights granted by the bankruptcy court, affirmed by the 
district court and discussed by us in Continental I, did not 
arise out of thin air. They were based on the Agreement. We 
made that crystal clear when this case was previously 
before us: "Therefore, we conclude that the right to 
seniority integration [set forth in the Agreement] gives rise 
to a `right of payment' such that the remedy constitutes a 
`claim' dischargeable in bankruptcy." In re Continental 
Airlines, Inc., 125 F.3d at 136. 
 
In Continental I, this court, as did the bankruptcy court 
and the district court, did not reject the Agreement. We 
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interpreted it. We construed the seniority provisions of the 
Agreement as a basis of providing a right of payment in lieu 
of injunctive relief after considering a variety of factors to 
include feasibility. The rejection-of-the-Agreement issue 
raised by Appellants is irrelevant here because the legal 
basis for the relief awarded -- arbitration to determine 
entitlement to, and if so, the amount of damages-- was 
based on an interpretation of the Agreement. What was 
involved here was a simple categorical deductive syllogism: 
All claims for seniority relief must be based on the 
Agreement; Appellants make a claim for seniority relief; 
therefore, Appellants' claims for seniority relief are based on 
the Agreement. 
 
III. 
 
We believe the critical question for decision in this appeal 
to be uncomplicated: Did this court in Continental I 
adjudicate only claims for pre-petition seniority rights or 
did our holding include also rights arising post- 
confirmation? The answer is not difficult. When Appellants 
appeared before us in Continental I by written brief and oral 
argument, and responded specifically to questions put to 
them by the court, and when they filed their Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, their arguments 
were clear and unequivocal: They demanded complete relief 
under the Agreement for the past, present and future.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For example, in the Eastern Pilots' brief presented to us in 
Continental 
I, they argued: 
 
       The cases have thus uniformly held that where the creditor is 
       seeking to require the debtor to take some future action, as 
opposed 
       to seeking money, the courts have held that the debtor's obligation 
       is not dischargeable . . . 
 
       The present case is likewise one in which these Eastern pilots are 
       not attempting to get money from Continental, but are simply 
       seeking to require Continental to take the future action of 
seniority 
       integration if the arbitrator orders it. 
 
Joint Appendix at 1033. 
 
The Pilots reasserted this argument in their reply brief stating: 
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We understood clearly what was before us then, and we 
adjudicated accordingly: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       [I]t cannot be argued in the present circumstances that there is 
any 
       viable claim for such monetary relief . . . What is left is the 
purely 
       equitable relief of seniority integration. 
 
       * * * * * 
 
       And is not a pilot's career spanning a life's work worth at least a 
       company's covenant not to compete? If a company's covenant not to 
       compete cannot be "reduced" to money damages and discharged in 
       bankruptcy, how can any court claim that a pilot's life-long career 
       can be "reduced" to non-existent money damages? 
 
Id. at 764-765. 
 
The transcript of oral argument in Continental I  also indicates that 
Appellants were seeking post-confirmation as well as pre-petition relief: 
 
       JUDGE MANSMANN: Okay; they get an arbitration award and 
       Continental says, "You're a little bit too late; we have gone 
through 
       this whole reorganization; there isn't anything here for you. Now 
       what do you do? 
 
       MR. MCGUINN: There is something there for them. There are jobs 
       there for them. They can be put on the Continental seniority list 
and 
       that's all they are seeking in this case, to get an arbitration for 
       seniority integration under the LPPs that they were promised 11 
       years ago. 
 
* * * * * 
 
       MR. MCGUINN: I just want to make sure that you are not 
       substituting "money damages" for "seniority integration" because 
       you have to understand, pilots, their whole career is based on 
       seniority. Simply, reinstatement without seniority integration is 
       fairly meaningless. 
 
       Seniority integration is what is provided for in the LPPs; that's 
what 
       we bargained for; that's what we want to get after 11 years. 
 
* * * * * 
 
       MR. MCGUINN: I think you are talking about a career, a career of 
       a pilot, where he goes from flight engineer or second officer to 
first 
       officer to captain, who builds up a retirement, who has the sheer 
       love of flying, and all of this has been denied that pilot because 
of 
       what is going on in this Bankruptcy Court and what is going on 
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       The circumstances indicate that seniority integration 
       would not be a feasible remedy and that an alternative 
       remedy of monetary damages would be appropriate. 
       Therefore, we conclude that the right to seniority 
       integration gives rise to a "right of payment" such that 
       the remedy constitutes a "claim" dischargeable in 
       bankruptcy. 
 
       We take care to note the boundaries of our holding. It 
       is not our purpose to suggest the award the arbitrator 
       should grant, if an award is warranted upon 
       disposition of the LLP dispute. Our holding is limited to 
       how the claims should be treated in bankruptcy. 
       Simply put, we hold that any claim based on an award 
       of seniority integration arising out of the resolution of 
       the LPP dispute will be treated as a claim in bankruptcy 
       giving rise to a right of payment. As such, the right to 
       seniority integration is satisfiable by the payment of 
       money damages. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       with these judicial pronouncements that are totally contrary to 
       Norris-LaGuardia, totally contrary to 1113, where Congress has 
       repeatedly, since the 1930s, said, "Please, Judiciaries, stay out 
of 
       labor disputes; let them be resolved in arbitration." 
 
Id. at 641-644 (emphasis added). 
 
Finally, Appellants' Petition For Certiorari to the Supreme Court 
reinforces the broad scope of relief they sought: 
 
       Similarly, these Eastern pilots maintain that losing their pilot 
jobs 
       at Eastern cannot be compensated by mere money damages (even if 
       real money damages were available). For what is involved is work -- 
       a life-long career -- with all its tangible and intangible 
benefits, 
       such as the sheer love of flying, travel benefits, a secure 
retirement, 
       the self-esteem and self-worth derived from a job well done, the 
       emotional fulfillment of career advancement from second officer to 
       first officer and finally, after years of preparation on a mature 
       airline, to a captain position. All of these are basic and 
essential 
       elements animating and driving the human spirit of a pilot. To 
claim 
       that they can be "reduced" to nonexistent front pay is not only 
       "disingenuous," but an unwarranted insult to all professional 
airline 
       pilots. 
 
Id. at 417. 
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In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 125 F.3d at 136 (emphasis 
added). 
 
Suffice it to say that when we said "any claim based on 
an award of seniority integration," we meant precisely what 
we said. With apologies to Gertrude Stein, "any claim" 
means any claim. If we intended to limit the Claim to pre- 
petition activity, we would have said so. And if Appellants 
desired the Claim to be so limited, they, too, would have 
said so in their written briefs or at oral argument or in their 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court. But 
they did not. 
 
Appellants expressly requested global, open-ended relief 
on their terms. As Roscoe Pound would have phrased it in 
his felicitous expression, they wanted "specific redress" in 
the form of a mandatory injunction, not "substituted 
redress" in the form of money damages.2  We hold that the 
proposition now urged upon us by Appellants has been 
decided and is totally controlled by our decision in 
Continental I. The relief defined in that case is the only 
remedy available to Appellants. 
 
IV. 
 
The preclusive effects of former adjudication have been 
discussed and determined in varying and occasionally 
conflicting terminology over the past hundred years. In 
early years, these concepts were referred to collectively by 
most commentators as the doctrine of res judicata. 18 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 4402, at 6-7 (1981 and 
2000 Supp.). As the law developed, a distinction was made 
between "pure" res judicata and what came to be known as 
collateral estoppel. In 1979, the Court explained the 
distinction: 
 
       Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the 
       merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the 
       same parties or their privies based on the same cause 
       of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV.641, 
647 (1923). 
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       the other hand, the second action is upon a different 
       cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit 
       precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and 
       necessary to the outcome of the first action. 1B J. 
       MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE P 0.405 [1],pp. 622-624 (2d 
       ed. 1974); e.g. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 
       349 U.S. 322, 326; Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 
       591, 597; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352- 
       353. 
 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 
(1979). 
 
Today, however, the modern nomenclature for these two 
doctrines is "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion," 
respectively: 
 
       Claim preclusion generally refers to the effect of a prior 
       judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of the very 
       same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim 
       raises the same issues as the earlier suit. Issue 
       preclusion generally refers to the effect of a prior 
       judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of an issue 
       of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid 
       court determination essential to the prior judgment, 
       whether or not the issue arises on the same or a 
       different claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
       S S 17, 27, pp. 148, 250 (1980); D. S HAPIRO, CIVIL 
       PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN C IVIL ACTIONS 32, 46 (2001). 
 
New Hampshire v. Maine, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 1814 (2001). 
 
These two doctrines share the "dual purpose of protecting 
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue 
with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial 
economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane 
Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 326. 
 
The doctrine of the law of the case is similar in that it 
limits relitigation of an issue once it has been decided. 
However, this doctrine is concerned with the extent to 
which the law applied in decisions at various stages of the 
same litigation becomes the governing legal precept in later 
stages. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
P 134.20 (3d ed. 1999). The Court has defined the law of 
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the case as a precept that " `posits that when a court 
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to 
govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same 
case.' This rule of practice promotes the finality and 
efficiency of the judicial process by `protecting against the 
agitation of settled issues.' " Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988) (citing Arizona v. 
California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983), and citing 1B JAMES 
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE P 0.404[1], p. 
118 (1984)). 
 
Writing in 1967, Professor Allan D. Vestal identified 
distinct situations in which a ruling or decision has been 
made in a case and the same legal problem arises a second 
time in the same case. Two of these situations are when: (1) 
an appellate court may rule on a matter and then the same 
legal question may be raised in the trial court after the case 
has been remanded to that court for further proceedings; 
and (2) an appellate court may rule on a matter and then 
the same legal question may be raised in the same 
appellate court when the case is appealed a second time.3 
The appeal before us fits squarely within the second 
situation identified by Professor Vestal. 
 
We do not believe that it is necessary to determine which 
of the foregoing doctrines prevents Appellants from 
relitigating an issue that was unambiguously identified, 
properly presented and ably and vigorously argued by 
extremely able counsel of all parties. We are satisfied that 
under any of these precepts, Appellants are bound by our 
previous decision and are precluded from avoiding its 
mandate. 
 
Although Appellants argue alternatively that this panel 
should reconsider the holding of Continental I , we lack the 
power or authority to overrule a decision of a previous panel.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 12 UTAH L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1967). 
 
4. "It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a 
reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent 
panel overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel. 
Court en banc consideration is required to do so." 3D CIR. I.O.P. 9.1. 
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Nor are we inclined to initiate a suggestion for rehearing en 
banc. 
 
* * * 
 
We have considered all contentions presented by the 
parties and conclude that no further discussion is 
necessary. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                13 
